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Abstract 
 
This study aims to review the main organisational theories identifying 
the significant roles of the board of directors in order to analyse how the 
board composition influences both CSR activity and disclosure. We 
present a literature review of the main organisational theories in order to 
identify their implications for non-financial information disclosure and 
disclosure of diversity information. The non-financial information is a 
tool for organisations to discharge their accountability to various 
stakeholder groups, allowing the organisation to legitimise its 
performance and manage the perception of its stakeholders and thus 
preserving its image and the status of legitimacy in society. Moreover, it 
seems that disclosing the board composition has a positive effect on 
corporate performance by enhancing transparency, reducing information 
asymmetry, discharging accountability, signalling legitimacy, and 
achieving excellence. The main limitation of the study is that the 
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findings could be generalised by applying quantitative research methods, 
such as a multiple case study approach, which is useful to explore the 
dissemination of a new phenomenon. In order to define a theoretical 
framework, for each theory we highlighted its implications for non-
financial information disclosure and disclosure of board diversity 
information. The study aims to contribute to the debate on CSR by 
providing insights for future research. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Gray, Owen, and Adams (2010), ‘theory is, at its simplest, a 
conception of the relationship between things. It refers to a mental state 
or framework and, as a result, determines, inter alia, how we look at 
things, how we perceive things, what things we see as being joined to 
other things and what we see as “good” and what we see as “bad”’ (p. 6). 
Specifically, regarding social accounting, it is necessary to have theories 
that help us to observe, organise, and explain a series of things, such as 
defining what is meant by social accounting, its effects, what problems 
the social accounting seeks to solve, and what makes a good or bad 
practice of social accounting (Gray et al., 2010). 
Within corporate social responsibility (CSR) accounting, a series of 
theories was produced concerning the motivation of companies to disclose 
information about their CSR activities and the explanation of why an 
organisation tends to disclose IC7information (An, Davey, & Eggleton, 
2011; Dumay & Guthrie, 2017). In other words, theories combine 
different approaches and use the same terminology with different 
meanings (Garriga & Melè, 2004).  
Many of these theories are interrelated and are part of an 
integrated framework based on the premise that corporate disclosure has 
a positive effect on corporate performance by, for example, reducing 
information asymmetry, discharging accountability, signalling 
legitimacy, and achieving excellence (An et al., 2011). In this paper, we 
analyse the main organisational theories that have implications for non-
financial information disclosure and disclosure of diversity information.  
Social accounting is an essential aspect of CSR; in fact, it is 
considered as a mechanism aimed at enhancing corporate accountability 
and transparency to stakeholders, addressing the social, environmental, 
and ethical values. Moreover, the establishment of the mechanisms for 
monitoring and controlling a company’s activities falls within the 
responsibility of the board of directors, which, therefore, is responsible 
for the accountability and transparency of a company through 
information disclosure (Dias, Lúcia Lima, & Russell, 2017). Thus, based 
on the relation between the board decisions and the involvement in CSR 
practices and related disclosure, it may be interesting to analyse how the 
board composition influences the CSR activity and the CSR disclosure. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section 
reviews the theoretical foundations of corporate governance and CSR, 
highlighting the board’s capability to influence the disclosure of non-
financial information. The third section analyses the main organisational 
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theories to identify their implications for non-financial information 
disclosure and disclosure of diversity information. Finally, the last 
section presents our discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
According to Bear, Rahman, and Post (2010), corporate governance and 
corporate sustainability should not be considered independently of each 
other. Corporate governance planning requires the implementation of 
sustainable goals, which provides structural measures that have 
repercussions on the company’s establishment. Therefore, it is important 
to redefine the governance system that is responsible for defining and 
implementing corporate sustainability strategies (Van Marrewijk, 2003). 
Specifically, the link between corporate governance and corporate 
sustainability is defined as a two-way relationship. It is important that 
corporate sustainability governance is part of the corporate leadership, so 
corporate governance needs to be reconfigured and corporate 
sustainability has to be integrated into a company’s functions 
transversally involving all management processes (Naciti, 2019). 
CSR can be defined as an activity of companies that look beyond 
profits and pay more attention to transparency, ethical values, 
relationships with employees, and respect for the law. In other words, 
CSR is the strategy with which a firm expresses its identity and the 
actions that allow applying this identity. Based on enlarged governance, 
CSR has effects on the internal organisation of the company and the 
external context with which it is active (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011). 
Specifically, the internal dimension of the company includes the 
management of human resources, workers’ rights, health and safety at 
work, and the management of natural resources and environmental 
effects. Among these aspects, the most important field for the application 
of social responsibility practices is the internal management of human 
resources. On the other side, the external dimension on which the CSR 
has effects is related to consumers, local communities, suppliers and 
customers, and environmental, social, and human rights issues.  
Based on the CSR perspective, non-financial disclosure has become 
fundamental because it involves broader aspects than financial 
accounting for shareholders, such as the different dimensions related to 
the social, environmental, ethical, risk, and governance aspects, which 
may be of interest to all stakeholders (Manes-Rossi, Tiron-Tudor, Niccolò, 
& Zanellato, 2018). According to Aldrugi and Abdo (2014), the 
importance of CSR disclosure is highlighted by different aspects; in fact, 
it produces many benefits for both the society in which the entity 
operates and the reporting entity. Moreover, a comprehensive disclosure 
of the CSR activities and sustainability position of a firm represents its 
reporting quality (Abdo & Al-Drugi, 2012). Thus, the dissemination of the 
transparency culture allows recovering the effectiveness of economic and 
financial communication.  
CSR reporting aims to respond to external pressures arising from 
different stakeholders; in fact, it is considered as a way of communication 
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between an enterprise and its stakeholders, providing information about 
an enterprise’s strategy, social policies, and CSR performance (Dumay, 
2016; Dumay, Frost, & Beck, 2015; Matuszak & Rózanska, 2017). In 
other words, disclosing CSR information means providing information 
about the social and environmental aspects of the company’s operations. 
Therefore, according to Carini, Rocca, Veneziani, and Teodori (2017), 
non-financial information could help managers, and other stakeholders, 
to make decisions more consciously. 
In addition to the relationship with corporate sustainability, 
corporate governance allows defining how companies are organised by 
specifying the function, structure, and role of the board of directors. The 
board of directors of a firm is the body that determines policies for 
corporate management and makes decisions on major company issues 
(Naciti, 2019), so it ensures close alignment between the interests of 
shareholders and managers. In other words, the board is the main 
vehicle by which corporate governance takes place, so based on the 
direction of the firm’s operations and decision-making, it is responsible 
for protecting the specific interests of stakeholders of a firm. Therefore, 
according to Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz (2014), strong corporate 
governance can mitigate agency problems and encourage managers to 
operate properly. 
Recently, the composition of corporate boards and board diversity 
has been a growing research field (Cucari, De Falco, & Orlando, 2018; 
Huse, Nielsen, & Hagen, 2009; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Seierstad, Warner-
Søderholm, Torchia, & Huse, 2017; Solimene, Coluccia, & Fontana, 
2017). Board diversity can be defined as variations in the composition of 
the board of directors, and it may affect the effectiveness of the corporate 
board in a different way because it is presented as both fiduciary and 
advisory (Hoang, Abeysekera, & Ma, 2016). 
 
3. THE ROLES OF THE BOARD ACCORDING TO THE MAIN 
ORGANISATIONAL THEORIES 
 
In the following sections, we analyse the main organisational theories in 
order to identify their implications for non-financial information 
disclosure and disclosure of diversity information. Specifically, these 
theories concern the motivation that leads a firm to disclose CSR 
information (An et al., 2011; Dumay & Guthrie, 2017). Based on the 
main organisational theories, we identified the significant roles of the 
board of directors and described how it should be structured to deal 
efficiently with the relationships with the main organisational actors. In 
addition, in order to define a theoretical framework, for each theory we 
highlighted its implications for non-financial information disclosure and 
disclosure of board diversity information. 
 
3.1. Agency theory 
 
An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) ‘as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
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another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent’ (p. 308). 
The most commonly studied principal–agent relationships are between 
the shareholder and the management, the major and minor owners, and 
the creditor and shareholder (or management) of an organisation, 
categorised into three types of the agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Gilson & Gordon, 2003). Specifically, both the principal and the 
agent are utility maximisers, so they try to maximise their individual 
interests, and, consequently, their interests are not aligned; this can 
cause conflicts of interest, producing the agency problem, which can only 
be avoided if the parties fully share the same interests (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
According to Ness and Mirza (1991), in the agency theory field, 
managers tend to disclose information if it involves an increase of their 
benefits, which, in other words, occurs when the benefits deriving from 
disclosure are higher than the related costs. However, referring to the 
agency theory and CSR disclosure, non-financial disclosure reduces the 
information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, and also 
between shareholders and the management in the corporate context. As 
a result, it could eliminate agency problems and reduce opportunistic 
behaviour, offering to shareholders the opportunity to monitor the 
company (An et al., 2011). 
Agency theory is among the most recognised in research on the 
contribution of boards (Huse, 2007). This approach provides the rationale 
for the board’s critical function of monitoring management on behalf of 
the shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983); thus, the board needs the 
appropriate mix of experience and capabilities to evaluate management 
and assess business strategies and their impact on CSR (Bear et al., 
2010).   
According to agency theory, ‘board contribution to organizational 
performance occurs by reducing agency cost arising from noncompliance 
of executives with established goals and procedures, by articulating 
shareholders’ objectives and focusing the attention of key executives on 
company performance, and through strategic decision making and 
control’ (Huse, 2007, p. 123). Concerning board diversity, agency theory 
suggests that diversity of the corporate board leads to the increase of 
board independence and a consequent improvement of the ability of the 
board to monitor management, with a positive impact on the firm’s 
financial performance (Galbreath, 2018). 
 
3.2. Shareholder theory 
 
Shareholder theory treats the shareholders as the only group to which 
the organisation must be socially responsible because it assumes that the 
interests of management and shareholders are the same. According to 
Friedman (1970), a corporation is an artificial person, and so it may have 
artificial responsibilities because only people can have responsibilities, 
but ‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in 
this vague sense.  
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From the shareholder perspective, in a private-property system 
with a free enterprise, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners 
of the business who has a direct responsibility to his or her employers to 
manage the business in line with their wishes. Thus, the corporate 
executive is an agent who serves the interests of his or her principal 
(Friedman, 1970) based on the deontological obligations deriving from 
the contract between managers and shareholders (Mansell, 2013). In 
other words, managers have a moral duty to maximise the value of the 
investment of their principals (shareholders).  
Regarding non-financial disclosure, shareholders require companies 
to disclose information concerning their prospects for future performance 
and the sustainability of actual value-creation drivers. This involves 
effective communication about the risks that affect a firm’s strategies 
and the actions aimed to reduce as much as possible the risk of failures 
and make the most of emerging opportunities (Antonelli, D’Alessio, & 
Cuomo, 2016). Therefore, based on stakeholder theory, an organisation 
pursues CSR practices in order to understand and satisfy its 
stakeholders. 
 
3.3. Stewardship theory 
 
According to Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997), ‘stewardship 
theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with 
the objectives of their principals’ (p. 21). In order to achieve collective 
goals, the steward tends to put in place collectivist and pro-
organizational behaviours, trying to achieve the objectives of the 
organisation (Davis et al., 1997; Di Carlo, 2017). 
According to stewardship theory, the behaviour of the executive is 
aligned with the interests of the principals, and consequently, there is a 
strong relationship between the principal’s satisfaction and the success of 
the organisation (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1989, 1991). In 
fact, in maximising the shareholders’ wealth, the steward also maximises 
his or her utility functions (Davis et al., 1997; Di Carlo, 2017). 
Specifically, ‘the steward’s opportunity set is constrained by the 
perception that the utility gained from pro-organizational behaviour is 
higher than the utility that can be gained through individualistic, self-
serving behaviour’ (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25). 
According to stewardship theory, the main board tasks are service 
tasks and, specifically, collaborating strategy involvement, including 
mentorship. The role of boards is guiding management in achieving the 
missions and objectives of the enterprise (Huse, 2007). Therefore, like the 
agency theory, for stewardship theory, the organisation is an instrument 
used by the shareholder to maximise the return of his or her investment 
(Di Carlo, 2017). Moreover, as suggested by the agency theory, the 
stewardship theory explains the practice of voluntary disclosure that 
inspires the corporate disclosure policy regarding sustainability at the 
corporate level because the proportion of financial and non-financial 
information can reduce the information problem. 
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3.4. Resource dependence theory 
 
According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), resource dependence theory 
states that the organisation is an open system, and its behaviour is 
influenced by external factors. It is based on the assumptions that the 
resources in the environment are necessary for the survival of an 
organisation, but the procurement process of these resources is uncertain 
because they are rare, valuable, and inimitable.  
The acquisition of external resources needed for the organisation 
causes a modification of the organisation’s power relations with other 
organisations. In fact, it leads to a decrease of the organisation’s 
dependence on others and/or to an increase of others’ dependence on it. 
Moreover, resource dependence theory is based on the concept of the 
power that is central because it allows controlling vital resources. 
Organisational success is achieved when organisations maximise their 
power. In other words, much of the operation and structure of an 
organisation depend on the nature of the power relations between more 
organisations (Ulrich & Barney, 1984). 
In recent years, numerous studies devoted to CSR adopting a vision 
based on resources have been conducted (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). 
Specifically, ‘the resources dependence perspective can be extended to 
consider the role of social responsibility disclosure as a signal of 
improved social and environmental conduct and hence reputation in 
those fields because disclosure influences the external perception of 
reputation’ (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006, p. 125). 
Regarding board diversity, resource dependence theory identifies 
critical resources that the board’s function can provide to companies, 
including legitimacy, advice, and counsel (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
According to this theory, thanks to these board resources, the company is 
able to understand and respond to its environment, which can help it 
better manage CSR issues. In this perspective, cooperation and 
connection are two benefits for companies (Huse, 2007). Thus, directors 
are also valuable resources for companies’ management because they 
help companies manage environmental interdependencies thanks to 
their connections with stakeholders.  
Regarding the disclosure of board diversity, resource dependence 
theory suggests that it allows an organisation to develop its ability to 
obtain critical resources to cover stakeholders’ claims. In this sense, 
board diversity can improve the disclosure of value-relevant information, 
enhancing strategic decisions in relation to external stakeholders (Bravo, 
2018). In other words, according to resource dependence theory, diversity 
among directors is a fundamental resource for a firm because it allows 
the organisation to adopt relevant disclosure practices to stakeholders, 
addressing corporate social disclosure issues (Hoang et al., 2016). 
In general terms, resource dependence theory recognises that the 
board contributions have a direct impact on a firm’s CSR, such as 
enhancing the legitimacy and image of the firm, facilitating access to key 
resources, or linking the firm to important stakeholders. 
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3.5. Stakeholder theory 
 
Stakeholder theory expects that managers must identify and apply 
processes aimed at exclusively meeting the groups that have an interest 
in the business of a company (Freeman, 1984). In fact, the main goal of 
this approach is to manage and integrate the relationships and interests 
of different kinds of stakeholders, such as shareholders, customers, 
employees, communities, and suppliers, in order to ensure the long-term 
success of the company (Freeman & McVea, 2001). Freeman (1984, p. 
260) states that stakeholder theory enters in the CSR debate by 
suggesting that the managers of the corporations have a responsibility 
not simply to serve the general interests of society, but rather to serve 
the interests of the corporation’s stakeholders. In conclusion, ‘stakeholder 
theory can be used to help define the social account, first of all by 
informing the process of stakeholder identification, and then breaking 
down the general stakeholder categories into their constituent’ 
(Freeman, 1984, p. 253). 
According to Guthrie, Petty, & Ricceri (2006), ‘stakeholder theory 
highlights organisational accountability beyond simple economic or 
financial performance. It suggests that organisations will elect to 
voluntarily disclose information about their intellectual, social, and 
environmental performance, over and above mandatory requirements, in 
order to meet real or perceived stakeholder expectations’ (p. 256). 
Therefore, the stakeholder theory is a powerful means to explain, justify, 
and understand financial reporting and disclosure. In fact, management 
may use corporate disclosure as a tool for managing the information 
needs of most powerful stakeholders and manipulate them in order to 
obtain their support, which is necessary for their survival (Gray, Owen, 
& Adams, 1996). In other words, this perspective suggests that corporate 
governance and CSR disclosure should aim to enhance stakeholder 
engagement and organisational legitimacy. CSR disclosure is considered 
as a strategic response to society’s expectations (Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 
1995), so the development of a corporate reputation through performance 
and disclosure represents a strategic approach to managing stakeholder 
relationships (Dias et al., 2017).  
 
3.6. Legitimacy theory 
 
The legitimacy theory claims that the state of legitimacy is essential for 
the survival of an organisation because it is continually seeking to ensure 
that its activities respect the limits and norms of the societies in which it 
operates (Cuganesan, Ward, & Guthrie, 2007). Referring to the 
legitimacy theory, there is a ‘social contract’ that regulates the relation 
between a company and its society, with which the society expresses 
multiple expectations about how an organisation should conduct its 
operations.  
According to Suchman (1995), legitimacy is defined as a generalised 
perception that the actions of an entity are desirable and appropriate 
within a social system of values, norms, and beliefs. In particular, 
“NEW CHALLENGES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE” 
Naples, October 3-4, 2019 
443 
organisational legitimacy is not fixed but changes continuously, and thus 
organisations must necessarily adapt their activities to the requirements 
of legitimacy. 
However, a legitimacy gap can threaten the legitimacy of an 
organisation, and it often arises when the perception of society regarding 
the way an organisation should act and the actions actually performed by 
the organisation diverge (An et al., 2011). In order to reduce the 
legitimacy gap, an organisation can adopt various strategies, such as 
informing its stakeholders on the actual change of its performance or 
changing the stakeholders’ perceptions about its activities without 
changing its actual behaviour. Due to the disclosure of non-financial 
information, firms are able to legitimise their performance and manage 
the perception of their stakeholders (Cucari et al., 2018). Managers may 
have different perceptions of legitimacy, and so they may adopt different 
strategies to achieve the desired level of legitimacy. ‘Organizations 
should voluntarily report on information that is expected by society since 
the compliance of societal expectations could result in continued inflows 
of capital, labour and customers’ (An et al., 2011, p. 577). 
 Therefore, the public disclosure of the information would be an 
effective tool to apply these strategies. In this sense, ‘legitimacy theory 
suggests that reporting is used as a communication mechanism to inform 
and/or manipulate the perceptions of the firm’s actions’ (Tilt, 2009, p. 15). 
CSR disclosure is able to enhance the effect of CSR on corporate 
reputation because it represents a signal of improved social and 
environmental conduct (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). Through the 
legitimisation strategy, organisations try to disclose their CSR activities 
in order to communicate their legitimisation actions. 
 
3.7. Signalling theory 
 
Signalling theory deals with finding possible solutions to problems 
related to information asymmetry in social contexts and, consequently, 
reducing information asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). 
The classic signalling model occurs in a market setting between the 
seller and the buyer, where the seller usually has an information 
advantage over the buyer about the characteristics of its services and 
products. Generally, buyers do not have much information about specific 
goods, but they may have general perceptions in purchasing that they 
will do. Consequently, the seller of high-quality products has an 
incentive to signal the quality of his or her products to the buyer for 
legitimising the highest selling price (An et al., 2011).   
Applying the classic model in a company context, the management 
of a company generally has more information than investors with regard 
to the specific functioning of the company. Therefore, information 
asymmetry is created, and it does not allow investors to fully understand 
the quality of the company and, consequently, they cannot compare the 
quality of the various companies. Therefore, the high-quality company 
has an incentive to signal its advantages to the market, emphasising its 
superior quality in order to attract more investors (An et al., 2011). 
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Regarding non-financial disclosure, corporate disclosure has a 
positive effect on corporate performance by signalling legitimacy. In 
general terms, “annual reports are a highly useful source of data because 
managers of companies commonly signal what is important through the 
reporting mechanism” (Guthrie & Petty, 2000, p. 244). 
According to signalling theory, companies that have a high quality 
should signal their advantages to the market. In this way, investors and 
other stakeholders are able to evaluate the value of the company and 
make decisions with greater awareness and more favourability to the 
company. At the same time, encouraging stakeholders, the signalling 
would allow a company to get more investment and reduce the costs of 
raising capital (An et al., 2011). 
Concerning the relationship between board diversity and corporate 
reputation, the signalling theory expects that the board gender 
composition disclosure may represent a signal able to indicate that the 
firm is socially responsible, due to paying attention to women and 
minorities on a firm’s board (Bear et al., 2010). 
In conclusion, CSR disclosure is treated by signalling theory as a 
signal able to improve the organisation’s corporate image, attract 
investors, and improve its relationships with stakeholders. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In the last few years, disclosure of non-financial information has received 
growing attention because it could help managers, and other 
stakeholders, to make decisions more consciously (Carini et al., 2018). In 
addition to the transparency of financial activities disclosed in the 
annual report, stakeholders demand greater corporate accountability 
regarding performance, as well as social and environmental issues. In 
this perspective, the corporate governance is able to influence the 
transparency of corporate communications and disclosures, more 
specifically CSR disclosure (Adnan, Hay, & Staden, 2018). Thus, most 
companies voluntarily disclose CSR matters, obtaining corporate benefits 
such as better recruitment of employees, internal decision-making, 
corporate image, and relations with stakeholders. 
Regarding the disclosure of non-financial information, the 
organisational theories analysed in this paper outline why organisations 
disclose corporate information based on the assumption that corporate 
disclosure has a positive effect on corporate performance by reducing 
information asymmetry, enhancing transparency, discharging 
accountability, signalling legitimacy, and achieving excellence (An et al., 
2011).  
There is no universal theory on CSR disclosure suitable for all kinds 
of organisations. Agency theory provides that CSR disclosure could 
reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders of 
an organisation. According to shareholder theory, non-financial 
information allows the organisation to enhance transparency with its 
shareholder, which requires information related to the sustainability of 
actual value-creation drivers. At the same time, stakeholder theory 
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considers CSR disclosure as a means for organisations to discharge their 
accountability to various stakeholder groups, while legitimacy theory 
suggests that it allows the organisation to legitimise its performance and 
manage the perception of its stakeholders, preserving the status of 
legitimacy in society (Cucari et al., 2018). Finally, based on signalling 
theory, CSR disclosure is a signal able to improve the organisation’s 
corporate image, attract investors, lower capital costs, and, more 
generally, improve relationships with various stakeholders. 
Board composition is an important determinant for CSR disclosure, 
since it is influenced by the choices, motives, and values of those who are 
involved in formulating and making decisions in the organisations 
(Hoang et al, 2016).  
Among the organisational theories analysed, those that emphasise 
the importance of disclosure of board diversity are mainly agency theory, 
resource dependence theory, and signalling theory. They suggest that 
board diversity allows an organisation a) to increase the board 
independence, improving the board’s ability to monitor management; b) 
to adopt relevant disclosure practices to stakeholders, addressing 
corporate social disclosure issues; and c) to be socially responsible, due to 
paying attention to women and minorities on a firm’s board.  
We observed that the other theories do not refer to the board 
diversity issue, focusing only on the board’s role. In fact, recently, the 
roles of corporate boards have received much attention by scholars 
investigating what roles boards of directors actually perform and what 
roles they should perform (Huse, 2007). 
In conclusion, we argued that based on the main organisational 
theories, non-financial information disclosure is a means for 
organisations to discharge their accountability to various stakeholder 
groups, allowing the organisation to legitimise its performance and 
manage the perception of its stakeholders, thereby preserving its image 
and the status of legitimacy in society. 
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